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Abstract
In the wake of  the Arab popular uprisings, this short piece revisits the thought of  an 
earlier generation of  revolutionaries. Unlike those today, who are united by the desire to 
overthrow authoritarian regimes but who come from competing ideological universes and 
conceptions of  the political, this earlier generation of  militants grounded political practice 
in a thick Marxist theoretical language. This paper focuses on the writings of  Waddah 
Charara as well as the Marxist tradition of  thought at the beginning of  the Lebanese 
civil and regional wars (1975–1990). It highlights how Charara’s analysis rethought the 
question of  power away from class politics in the wake of  his diagnosis of  the failure of 
hegemony in Lebanon. 
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Prelude
The Arab popular uprisings put the question of  emancipation back at the heart of  our 
present. Rebellions against authoritarian regimes, against the sectarian or ethnic dividing 
of  populations, and against military and economic intervention by external actors all 
contribute to render the question of  freedom and its complications more urgent. This 
paper revisits the thought of  an earlier generation of  revolutionaries who grew up in the 
wake of  the Palestininian Nakba (1948) and during the high tide of  Nasser’s anti-colonial 
nationalism to become, by the 1960s, critics of  Arab nationalism and pro-western Arab 
governments. Unlike today’s revolutionaries, who are united by the desire to overthrow 
the regimes but come from competing ideological universes and conceptions of  the politi-
cal, this earlier generation of  leftist militants grounded political practice in a thick Marxist 
theoretical language. Lenin’s adage, ‘without revolutionary theory there is no revolution-
ary practice’, rang truer than ever in the ears of  those who were attuned to the unfolding 
global events in China, Cuba and Vietnam, as well as to the workers’ and students’ strikes 
in Europe.
This paper focuses on Waddah Charara’s (1942–) revolutionary writings of  the late 1960s, 
and those written after his exit from political practice, as well as the Marxist tradition 
of  thought at the beginning of  the Lebanese civil and regional wars (1975–1990). Cha-
rara was a major theorist of  the Lebanese New Left in the 1960s and early 1970s, who, 
with Fawwaz Traboulsi, co-founded the Marxist organisation Socialist Lebanon (Lubnān 
al-Ishtirakī) (1964–1970) that later merged with the Organisation of  Lebanese Socialists 
(Munẓama al-Ishterakīyyīn al-Lubnānīyyīn) to found the Organisation of  Communist 
Action in Lebanon (Munẓama al-ʿAmal al-Shuyūʿī fī Lubnān) (1971–). This organisation 
played a pivotal role in the Lebanese National Movement, the coalition of  leftist and pan-
Arab parties, in the first years of  the Lebanese wars. The paper highlights how Charara’s 
analysis rethought the question of  power away from class politics in the wake of  his diag-
nosis of  the failure of  hegemony in Lebanon. 
In reopening this rarely examined archive of  these older generation militants, revisiting 
their revolutionary hopes and subsequent disenchantments, and unearthing the theoreti-
cal infrastructure of  their thought and political prognoses, we do not collapse the distance 
between their past and our present, nor do we retrospectively judge whether they were 
right or wrong in their analyses and political wagers. In revisiting the critical and political 
labours of  this earlier generation, sketching how the question of  freedom was posed and 
in what way politics was conceived, this paper will reconstruct their questions and answers 
as an antidote to public amnesia, to recover the modes of  social criticism and the visions 
of  emancipation which animated previous generations of  thinkers and militants. 
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Two Resistances: The Palestinian and the Lebanese
On the pages of  their underground mimeographed bulletin, Socialist Lebanon gave a 
leftist critique of  both pro-Soviet communist parties, such as the Lebanese Communist 
Party (Parti Communiste Libanais) (1924) – via a Marxian retour aux sources that undercut 
the Soviet mediators – and the national liberation, progressive regimes of  the mid-1960s. 
Marginal at first, Socialist Lebanon’s critique was catapulted into the limelight in the after-
math of  the 1967 military defeat of  the Arab regimes against Israel, which witnessed the 
conversion of  many Arab nationalists to Marxism. It was at this time, which was charac-
terised by the rising star of  the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon, the eclipse of  nationalist 
progressive regimes and the adoption of  Marxism Leninism by previously Arab national-
ist allies of  President Nasser, that Socialist Lebanon saw their historical chance.1 
‘The ruling Lebanese interests cannot acknowledge the links that tie its farmhouse, Leb-
anon, to the region’s causes’, wrote the anonymous author of  ‘Two Resistances: The 
Palestinian and the Lebanese’, a central piece which captures the height of  Socialist Leb-
anon’s activist fervour in 1969 and its theorisation of  the impact of  the new revolutionary 
agent, the Palestinian resistance, on Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries.2 The 
long, sophisticated and scathing article towards Lebanese nationalists and authorities 
located the Palestinian resistance as the external revolutionary agent, which would deto-
nate the contradictions of  the Lebanese system. ‘The Lebanese position’, wrote Charara, 
‘i.e. the authorities’ position, is clear, Lebanon is of  the Arab region: its economy and the 
prosperity of  its financiers and merchants rise on the role they play in that region. Leb-
anon, however, is on the margin of  the Arab region when it comes to political problems 
threatening to destabilise those who rule it.’ ‘The Lebanese entity’, continued Socialist 
Lebanon’s major theorist contemptuously, ‘is the fortified haven for the domination of  a 
financial–commercial bourgeoisie that would not have existed if  not for the role it plays in 
the imperialist pillage operation of  the Arab region.’ 3
The diagnosis put forth in 1969 was a strong indictment of  the Lebanese nationalist pol-
itics of  neutrality in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and of  the country’s laissez-faire capitalist 
system. This was a politics that sought, at one and the same time, to be fully economically 
1   See Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism 
to Communism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975) and Samir Kassir, The War of  Lebanon: On National 
Dissension and Regional Conflict [La Guerre du Liban: De la Dissension Nationale au Conflit Régional 
1975–82], (Karthala: Paris, 1994). 
2  ‘Two Resistances: The Palestinian and the Lebanese’, Socialist Lebanon 16, (September 1969). All 
further citations unless indicated otherwise are from this source. The author’s research indicates that 
Waddah Charara is the author of  this key piece, along with some his other comrades at the time. Spe-
cific members of  Socialist Lebanon wrote the bulletin’s articles, but none of  them were signed. The 
Marxist organisation subscribed to a collectivist ethos which was shown by assigning the authorship of 
texts the organisation itself. 
3  ‘The entity’, as in the Lebanese entity, is a designation used pejoratively by political commentators and 
actors wishing not to bestow legitimacy and recognition. Israel, for example, is sometimes referred to as 
the Zionist entity, while fervent Syrian nationalists refer to Lebanon as the Lebanese entity. 
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integrated in the region as the link between imperialist markets and Arab ones, and to 
isolate itself  from the region’s politics. It was into this situation, characterised by Lebanese 
economic integration in, and political isolation from, the Arab world, that the Palestinian 
resistance would make its entrance. The Palestinian revolution in the fall of  1969 con-
stituted a contradiction to Lebanon’s political isolation, a breach of  ‘Lebanon’s political 
fort’, which was under the illusion of  being able to live isolated from the region’s cardinal 
events. The Palestinian resistance unmasked the real face of  the Lebanese regime, for 
‘how can a rule that plays the role of  the watchdog of  imperialist dependence agitate an 
entire people for a national battle?’ and how can the Lebanese system, which survives 
on the remains of  imperial interests, go through this battle that will put its banks, agents, 
and summer resorts in danger?’ asked the author. More importantly, the Palestinian resis-
tance, according to Charara’s 1969 prognosis, would be able to transcend the sectarian 
allegiances of  the Lebanese, first because
The public that fought the battle in 1958 fought it with loyalty to the feudal lords, 
[and] a sectarian, familial, local loyalty that was enhanced by their representing 
a Nasserite, Arabist tendency. While the [current] rallying around the Palestinian 
resistance rises on the remains of  that loyalty... and we have seen this same public 
on 23 April shouting expletives in the faces of  its traditional leaders from Yafi, to 
Hakim, to Hassan Khaled...
The event in itself  carries a potential that allows, and this has been proven, the 
breaking of  traditional sectarian loyalties, transforming them into national loyal-
ties, that will fragment the base of  the sectarian Right whatever the sect it belongs 
to. Does the fact that the main transformation is happening amongst Muslims 
lessen its value? Not at all. The sectarian knot is not solved in one go, and if  the 
entry point to its dissolution is revealing the conflict [i.e. its political nature] on 
the Muslim level, the next level would certainly reveal its true nature when the 
Muslim Right finds its natural ally in the Christian right. 
The radicalisation of  Muslim public opinion embracing the resistance and insulting its 
traditional political leaders, such as Hassan Khaled, the grand Mufti of  Lebanon, in the 
large demonstrations in support of  Palestinians on 23 April 1969, during which the Leb-
anese army opened fire, killing and wounding a number of  protesters, led Charara to be 
hopeful about the role the Palestinian detonator was playing in revealing to the masses the 
true political nature of  the conflict. As they began to be interpellated by the national ques-
tion, the masses were breaking free from their traditional leaders. This contrasted with the 
case of  the 1958 Civil War, which rested on sectarian–familial–local loyalties propagated 
by Nasser’s Arab nationalist ideology. The Palestinian agent, which acted as a solvent of 
sectarian loyalties and contributed to a rearticulation of  politics along national lines, was 
enhanced by a second factor, since 
The conflict does not take place on the closed internal level. The factor that is 
detonating it is not ‘Lebanese’... It is far more reaching, and it shall extract the 
conflict from its ‘Lebaneseness’ – i.e. from its specificity, and hence its sectarian 
nature – to posit it on the level of  the whole region. And therefore the poles of  the 
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ruling alliances can no longer contain it within the sectarian frame because it re-
veals their common positions despite their different sects. And this position is not 
only in contradiction with the continuity of  the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon 
but also with the rest of  the Arab people on which the Lebanese bourgeoisie relies 
to assure its continuity by living off  it and cashing commissions on its account.
The Palestinian resistance qua external Arab agent, ‘the detonator of  the contradictions 
of  the whole Arab situation’, by transcending the sectarian frame which organised Leb-
anese politics, brought to light the more fundamental ground of  agreement between the 
Christian and Muslim bourgeoisies. The Palestinian revolution would neutralise the bour-
geoisie’s sectarian tricks and defences, revealing that the heart of  its politics was ‘interest 
based and political and can no longer veil itself  with sectarianism’.
‘These last two factors’, wrote Charara in the conclusion to ‘Two Resistances’, ‘in addi-
tion to the perseverance of  the Left in clarifying the reality of  the conflict, do not result 
in avoiding conflict if  the Right wants to push for it – but are amenable to transforming 
it from a sectarian conflict into a civil war.’ He continued by mentioning the ‘price’ this 
revolutionising of  the Lebanese polity would exact, ‘if  democratic national rule cannot 
be reached without a civil war, the ‘real coordination’ with feda ʾi action cannot [also] take 
place without exposing the southern region to an Israeli invasion.’
Charara’s 1969 prognosis was right in predicting the coming conflict and wrong in pre-
dicting its nature. Six years later, a civil war would erupt, splitting the country along 
sectarian lines. Nine years later (in 1978), Israel’s army would invade southern Leba-
non, succeeding in pushing the Palestine Liberation Organisation and leftist militants 
away from Israel’s northern borders. The years leading to the 1975 war would witness a 
number of  splits and expulsions from the young Organisation of  Communist Action in 
Lebanon, including Waddah Charara, who headed a large internal opposition movement 
along Maoist lines in 1973. Charara stopped any militant activity at the beginning of  the 
Civil War in 1975. His rich militant life spanned the fragile years of  civil peace between 
the 1958 Civil War and the 1975 one. Fawwaz Traboulsi, Socialist Lebanon’s co-founder, 
would go to the front in 1975, exiting militant life in the mid-1980s in the aftermath of 
the Israeli invasion of  Lebanon in 1982. But in 1969, it was still their historical chance. 
Exit Marx, Enter Ibn Khaldun 
Ten years after writing ‘Two Resistances,’ the blurb on the back of  Charara’s Wars of 
Subjugation: Lebanon the Permanent Civil War,4 a collection of  previously published essays, 
introduced the volume as follows:
4  Waddah Charara, Wars of  Subjugation: Lebanon, the Permanent Civil War [Ḥurūb al-Istitba ʾ, Lubnān 
al-Ḥarb al-Ahliyya al-Dāʾima] (Bayrūt: Dār al-Taliʿa, 1979) I will refer to the book as Wars of  Subjugation. 
The book is a collection of  essays published in between the autumn of  1974 and the winter of  1976.
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Contemporary Arab political thought has turned to – often through Marxism 
and Leninism – ideas and concepts that have formed its implicit and direct focal 
points. And it has formulated the issues of  Arab societies and their problems in 
the mold of  these ideas and concepts: The – unified – state, the dominant or 
hegemonic class, the unified political society, the dominant ideology, political and 
social democracy...
However, this mould has overlooked the socio-political fabric of  domination and power in 
our societies. It treated the matter theoretically and practically as if  it rested on hegemony 
or on national–popular unity.
The blurb could be read as an autocritique, after a major theorist of  the Lebanese New 
Left exited from political militancy in the first few months of  the Lebanese civil and 
regional wars.5 In the essays collected in Wars of  Subjugation, Charara announced the moral 
bankruptcy of  different explanations and justifications used by different warring parties 
regarding the atrocities committed in the first months of  the 1975 Civil War, notably those 
put forward by the Left. The political crisis also heralded an epistemological one, during 
which he sought to understand the new practices ushered in by the war and their relations 
to the Marxist analysis adopted by the Lebanese Left. Charara’s main analytical move was 
to rethink the modality of  power at work in Lebanese society in order to understand the 
sectarian Christian–Muslim sundering of  the Lebanese masses and the pillaging, deface-
ment and destruction that accompanied the fighting. 
During these civil wars, none of  the warring sides attempted, wrote Charara, to ‘win over 
elements from the opposing side’.
There is no doubt that all sides were declaring their concern about ‘unity’: Leba-
non’s unity, the unity of  the Lebanese [power-sharing] formula, the unity of  the 
Lebanese people... however what stood out in these positions was the incapacity 
to practice a politics of  unity that does not practically and on the ground conse-
crate a shift in the factional balance (namely the sectarian).6
The inability of  any one of  the warring sides to interpellate individuals from the other 
side, as well as the gap between the discourse on unity on the one hand and the inability 
of  this discourse to be translated into reality on the other, was related to the failure of 
hegemony. I quote at length Charara’s departure from Marxist analysis in his examination 
of  the Lebanese social fabric and its dominant modality of  power:
5  The ‘Black Saturday’ massacre took place on 6 December 1975, when, after discovering the bodies of 
four young men associated with the right wing Phalangist Party, the Christian militia men established 
checkpoints in Beirut, stopping cars, lining up and murdering ‘some 200 innocent Muslims, mostly port 
workers.’ On 18 January 1976, the Christian forces attacked Karantina, a north-eastern multi-ethnic 
(Kurds and Armenians), multi-national (Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese) and predominantly Muslim 
working class suburb of  Beirut under the control of  the PLO. After conquering the slum hundreds of 
civilians were massacred. Two days later, the National Movement and Palestinian forces, in reprisal for 
the Karantina massacre, attacked the Christian coastal town of  Damur south of  Beirut, killing around 
three hundred and fifty Christians. 
6  Wars of  Subjugation, p. 233.
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For power does not work (for reasons we will elucidate) on generalising a set of 
unified organisational and ideological criteria that cover the social networks of 
the country: production and educational networks as well as the political one... 
Rather, at the origin of  current power and social relations is a consecration of 
the independence of  intertwined units that share, amongst what else they share, 
power itself. And this distribution does not work in a unified political sphere that 
possesses a common fabric and rests on the triumph of  a socio-historical axis. For 
distribution rests on the multiplicity of  political spheres, ‘common’ fabrics, and 
dominant axes. From the politics of  the family, to the politics of  the sect, from 
the politics of  the profession to the politics of  the region, and from the politics of 
the political party to the politics of  the Arab axes, we do not just move from one 
formation to another, and it is not the numerical scale or the material support that 
is altered. What changes are the codes of  internal relations and the rules of  hier-
archy and its matter. For kinship does not rely on the same ground as the position 
vis-à-vis production and distribution relies on, and the political party establishes 
relationships of  force that are in disagreement with the balance of  loyalties in the 
region, and the relationships between sects is stabilised on a rule that is different 
from the Arab balance of  power, etc. The difference of  criteria and their variety 
(despite the intertwinement of  some of  them) raises difficult obstacles in the face 
of  power as hegemony and not dominance. While hegemony presupposes a gen-
eral political and ideological leadership that supplies the administrative and pro-
fessional one with all encompassing organisational criteria that conceal the basis 
of  power, dominance contents itself  with an external possession of  instruments of 
power: armed forces, administrative apparatuses and a share of  production. And 
as much as hegemony is enriched with a social content, the chances of  resorting 
daily to direct domination and its instruments is diminished. And as much as the 
social content of  domination becomes thinner, the necessity of  using armed forc-
es, administrative techniques, and the direct possession of  a sample of  production 
is increased. In the last case, power takes a form that Ibn Khaldun knew perfectly, 
that of  iltiḥām7(fusion) and istitbaʾ 8 (subjugation).
In the first few months of  the war, Charara began rethinking the categories through 
which the political ought to be apprehended in Lebanon, marginalising the ideological 
discourse of  Left and Right, and emphasising the modalities of  power and social relations 
that characterised his society. This failure of  a unified hegemonic power in the Lebanese 
context that overcame the multiplicity of  ‘infra-national’ – family, sect and regional – 
loyalties of  people resulted in Charara’s analysis of  the practice of  power as dominance. 
7  Rosenthal, the translator of  Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, renders ‘Iltiḥām’ as close contact, and 
‘Istitba ʾ’ as ‘subservience’, see Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Franz Rosenthal 
(trans), (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989 [1967]). I am translating ‘Iltiḥām’ as ‘fusion’. ‘Istitbaʾ’ 
will be translated as ‘subjugation’ as suggested by Waddah Charara.
8  Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 108: ‘Even if  an individual tribe has different ‘houses’ and many 
diverse group feelings, still, there must exist a group feeling that is stronger than all the other group 
feelings combined that is superior to them all and makes them subservient, and in which all the diverse 
group feelings coalesce, as it were, to become one greater group feeling.’ 
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This external modality of  power at work in Lebanese society, a ‘formal dominance’, as 
Charara dubbed it, did not seek to rework the internal social bonds of  the group it dom-
inated, to impose its own ideology on it, or to fashion new subjectivities, but rather was 
content with subjugating it while leaving its internal relations, hierarchies and codes intact. 
Gramsci’s elaboration of  his conceptual arsenal – comprising hegemony, historical block, 
war of  position and war of  manoeuvre – took place in the wake of  the failure of  socialist 
revolutions in Western Europe in the 1920s. His critique of  ‘economism’, by turning his 
analytical gaze to the political and ideological terrains and investigating the relationship 
between hegemony (consent) and domination (force), was an attempt to understand cap-
italist societies’ sources of  resilience.9 The Lebanese Civil War of  1975, which resulted 
in the fragmentation of  Lebanese state and society, was in a way the obverse of  a soci-
ety’s resilience to revolutionary transformation as a result of  the moral and intellectual 
leadership of  its dominant class. Charara’s argument about multiple foci and modalities 
of  power that foreclose the possibility of  class hegemony was not a return to a theory of 
essentialist culturalist attributes of  Arab societies, nor a historicist move emphasising the 
persistence of  pre-capitalist remainders in the present. His diagnosis put the emphasis on 
how these modalities of  power and loyalties are modernity’s offspring: 
Sectarianism, familialism and regionalism were not the ‘remainders’ of  pre-capi-
talist social relations. And while all of  them were based on elements that predate 
capitalism, they only rose to prominence in organising social and political life 
inside the movement of  capitalist expansion one the one hand, and inside the 
formation of  the Lebanese state with its frontiers, administration and hierarchies 
on the other hand.10
A Dissolutioned Left
The failure to produce autonomous individuals that broke away from regional, familial 
and sectarian circles of  belonging, and the discovery that the ‘Lebanese citizen’ did not 
exist, marginalised for Charara the leftist ideology that posited an opposition of  masses 
to bourgeoisie, or of  left-wing citizens against right-wing. This left him very critical of 
his ex-comrades. Leftist discourse was incongruent with facts on the ground, such as the 
sectarian massacres and the division of  fighters into more or less Christian and Muslim 
blocks. Leftist political practice for Charara was also guilty of  not attempting to break 
away from these modalities of  power by ‘propagating political and ideological criteria 
that form the content of  a different power’.11 This gap within the ideological political 
line – with its anti-imperial content on the one hand and its practices, modes of  opera-
tion and forms of  mobilisation on the other, and which led Charara away from the first 
9  David Forgacs (ed), The Antonio Gramsci Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
10  Charara, Wars of  Subjugation, p. 250. Nancy Gallagher (ed), Approaches to the History of  the Middle East: 
Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. 33.
11  Charara, Wars of  Subjugation, pp. 233–4. 
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and into a theorisation of  the second – was first noted by the militant intellectual in a 
comment, at the height of  the activist fervour of  Socialist Lebanon, in a sequel article 
to ‘Two Resistances: The Palestinian and the Lebanese’ (Part II) written in March 1970. 
In a very early moment of  doubt regarding the revolutionary potential of  the Palestin-
ian resistance, which he had theorised in the earlier article of  September 1969, Charara 
noted the rupture between the resistance’s supposed efficiency as a detonator of  Lebanese 
contradictions and its work with ‘traditional political actors’, as opposed to acting on a 
mass political level. He wrote in 1970, ‘And the resistance was not a stranger to all of 
these phenomena: it supplied them [the traditional forces that rise on personal, familial, 
regional loyalties] with material means, and nourished them with men sometimes, and in 
all considered this a sound phenomena to which it had no objection.’12 
Leftist parties did not attack the root of  the problem – social solidarity in Lebanese soci-
ety – and did not attempt to rearticulate the social bond in a different way. So while they 
talked about the masses, the political translation on the ground was always going to be 
weighed in the Christian/Muslim balance of  power. This was owing to the gap between 
the revolutionary ideology of  the battle and the actual sectarian power practices which 
worked according to the logic of  subjugation. This dissonance was translated into the 
lingo of  foreign reporters in the first years of  the war, who called the warring parties 
‘Islamo-progressives’ and ‘Christian-conservatives’. While Traboulsi adhered to the Pro-
gressive/Conservative divide, fighting alongside the Left, Charara, his comrade for the last 
decade, withdrew from political engagement as soon as the war began, finding it impossi-
ble to identify with any of  the warring parties, and deeming the Muslim/Christian divide 
and other regional or familial dividing loyalties as more consequential to the unfolding of 
events than the different ideological banners under which the parties were fighting.
Waddah Charara’s withdrawal from political practice in the first months of  the war and 
the critical distance he took from both camps was a very rare move at the time. With the 
waning power of  the Left in the following years of  the war, the defeat of  the PLO after the 
Israeli invasion of  1982, the increasingly inter- and intra-sectarian nature of  the war, and 
the rise of  Islamist political forces, a number of  leftist militants would experience similar 
disenchantment, coming to occupy a position which is at once critical of  the anti-imperial 
political rhetoric which hangs all the ills of  Arab societies on external enemies, and of  the 
regional, familial, and sectarian structures of  their societies. 
12  Socialist Lebanon 17, March 1970.
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